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A question fundamental to many psychological theories is 
how people assess similarity among objects (Dhar & Sherman, 
1996; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1990). Although many 
models of similarity judgments have been proposed (Medin, 
Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993), these models can largely be 
divided into two types: spatial models and feature-matching 
models (Larkey & Markman, 2005). Spatial models (e.g., 
Shepard, 1962) represent each object as a point in metric 
space; the distance between objects reflects the similarity 
between them. Feature-matching models (e.g., Tversky, 1977) 
characterize each object by a set of features; the number of 
common and distinctive features determines the degree of 
similarity between objects. In both types of models, introduc-
ing a difference between objects should not increase perceived 
similarity.
In contrast, we propose that introducing a small difference 
in an otherwise identical attribute can increase perceived simi-
larity. Our proposition is based on two ideas. First, an attribute 
is more likely to be ignored when it is identical across objects 
than when it differs across objects. For example, when people 
judge the similarity between two European countries, the fact 
that they are both in Europe is ignored unless the context 
includes non-European countries (Tversky, 1977; see also 
Medin & Goldstone, 1995). Similarly, Medin et al. (1993) 
showed that when people compare objects, features that do not 
vary across those objects may not be considered. This may 
be especially true in a choice context, because common fea-
tures provide no basis for choosing (Dhar & Sherman, 1996). 
Second, overall similarity is assessed by averaging perceived 
similarity across attributes, in a process consistent with a 
contingent averaging model of similarity judgments (e.g., 
Anderson, 1965).
Taken together, these two ideas imply that similarity may 
be based on an average of mostly distinctive features. For 
example, consider a choice between two different flavors of 
cereals. Suppose that the prices of the cereals are identical in 
one situation but slightly different in another. The prices will 
be less likely to be attended to when they are identical than 
when they differ. Consequently, similarity in flavors will likely 
be the only input to overall perceived similarity when the 
prices are identical, but similarity in flavors and similarity in 
prices will be averaged when the prices differ slightly. The 
two-attribute judgment can result in greater perceived similar-
ity than the single-attribute judgment because the second attri-
bute differs so little between the two cereals.
This similarity effect has consequences for choice. Recent 
research suggests that people can experience less difficulty in 
making a choice when options are more similar. Decision 
making entails not just choosing a favored option but also 
rejecting its alternatives, and rejecting alternatives often 
elicits counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret. When 
Corresponding Author:
Nathan Novemsky, Yale University, School of Management, 135 Prospect 
St., New Haven, CT 06520 
E-mail: nathan.novemsky@yale.edu
Adding Small Differences Can Increase 
Similarity and Choice
Jongmin Kim1, Nathan Novemsky2, and Ravi Dhar2
1School of Business, Singapore Management University, and 2Yale School of Management, Yale University
Abstract
Similarity plays a critical role in many judgments and choices. Traditional models of similarity posit that increasing the number 
of differences between objects cannot increase judged similarity between them. In contrast to these previous models, the 
present research shows that introducing a small difference in an attribute that previously was identical across objects can 
increase perceived similarity between those objects. We propose an explanation based on the idea that small differences 
draw more attention than identical attributes do and that people’s perceptions of similarity involve averaging attributes that 
are salient. We provide evidence that introducing small differences between objects increases perceived similarity. We also 
show that an increase in similarity decreases the difficulty of choice and the likelihood that a choice will be deferred.
Keywords
similarity, decision making, judgment, choice difficulty
Received 3/7/12; Revision accepted 5/30/12
Research Report
226  Kim et al.
the option not chosen is similar to the one that is chosen, peo-
ple may experience less anticipated regret and less difficulty in 
choosing because the counterfactuals are not very different 
from the actual outcome of the choice (Sagi & Friedland, 
2007). On the basis of this link between choice difficulty and 
similarity, we propose that introducing a small difference on 
an otherwise identical attribute will reduce choice difficulty by 
increasing the perceived similarity of the available options.
Difficulty in choosing has been shown to cause people to 
defer choices altogether (Dhar, 1996, 1997). For example, 
when people face difficult trade-offs, they are likely to defer 
making a choice (Dhar & Simonson, 2003). Therefore, we 
predicted that when an attribute that was identical among 
options in one choice set was varied across options in another 
choice set, people presented with the latter choice set would be 
less likely to defer their choice than people presented with the 
former choice set.
In sum, our main hypothesis was that, contrary to existing 
models of similarity, small differences can increase perceived 
similarity. One consequence of such increased similarity 
between choice alternatives is that it can reduce choice diffi-
culty and increase willingness to choose. We report four stud-
ies that tested our hypotheses.
Study 1: Introducing Small Differences Can 
Increase Perceived Similarity
In Study 1, we tested whether small price differences can 
increase perceived similarity between choice alternatives. 
We varied price in the context of a choice between ordinary 
items because in this situation, price is generally quite salient 
and may be difficult to ignore even if it is identical across 
alternatives.
Method
Ninety-three university students (57% women, 43% men) par-
ticipated in a survey session for monetary compensation. Par-
ticipants imagined that they went to a store to buy some tea 
and were presented with two options: lemon ginger tea or cit-
rus cinnamon tea. Participants saw an image, ingredients, ben-
efits, and the price of each tea. For one third of the participants, 
the prices of the two options were the same ($3.79; same-price 
condition). For the remaining participants, the prices were 
slightly different ($3.68 and $3.79, or vice versa; different-
price condition; one third of the total number of participants 
was assigned to each version of this condition). All partici-
pants were asked to choose one option and to indicate how 
similar the options were (scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 9, 
very).
Results and discussion
The choice share of lemon ginger tea did not differ between 
the two versions of the different-price condition (48% vs. 
42%), χ2(1, N = 62) < 1; perceived similarity of the two teas 
also did not differ between these conditions (6.42 vs. 6.03), 
t(59) < 1. Therefore, we combined the data in the different-
price conditions for the following analysis.
Supporting our hypothesis, analyses revealed that partici-
pants in the same-price condition indicated that the options 
were less similar, M = 4.94, than participants in the different-
price conditions indicated they were, M = 6.23, t(90) = 2.79, 
p < .01, η2 = .079. Choice shares did not differ across the con-
ditions (42% vs. 45%), χ2(1, N = 93) < 1.
We replicated this pattern of results with other objects. For 
example, participants at a Korean university were asked to 
choose between two cereal options (wheat and oats vs. brown 
rice and corn). The two cereals were perceived to be less simi-
lar when their prices were the same (W=3,700; approximately 
$4) than when their prices were slightly different (W=3,900 and 
W=3,700, or vice versa; same-price condition: M = 5.03, differ-
ent-price condition: M = 6.01), t(119) = 2.59, p < .05, η2 = 
.053. Another group of participants, who chose between res-
taurant entrées (tomato seafood vs. chili shrimp), also rated the 
two dishes as less similar when the prices were the same 
($17.00) than when they were slightly different ($17.00 and 
$18.00, or vice versa; same-price condition: M = 3.73; differ-
ent-price condition: M = 5.60), t(34) = 2.69, p < .05, η2 = .175.
Study 2: Drawing Attention to Identical 
Attributes
In Study 2, we tested our proposed mechanism for the similar-
ity effect observed in Study 1. We posited that introducing 
small differences increases perceived similarity because shared 
features receive less attention than distinctive features and do 
not influence similarity judgments. However, if attention is 
drawn to shared features, those features should be incorporated 
into similarity judgments, and perceived similarity should 
increase. To test this idea, we used a within-subjects design in 
which a feature was identical across options in one choice but 
varied across options in another choice, to draw attention to 
that feature (Grice, 1966).
Method
Ninety-four university students (56% women, 44% men) par-
ticipated in a survey session for monetary compensation. Par-
ticipants were presented with five entrées on a restaurant menu 
(salmon, chicken, tuna, pork ribs, and shrimp) and asked to 
choose among them. Prices were either all the same ($23.95; 
same-price condition) or all different ($23.25, $23.50, $23.95, 
$24.20, and $24.45; different-price condition). In the differ-
ent-price condition, the five prices were randomly assigned to 
the entrées. All participants chose one entrée and rated how 
similar the five options were (scale ranging from 1, not at all, 
to 9, very similar).
After completing this task, participants took part in 
an ostensibly unrelated study. They were presented with six 
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cereals that had either identical prices ($4.23; same-price con-
dition) or slightly different prices ($3.83, $3.89, $3.96, $4.07, 
$4.15, and $4.23; different-price condition). Participants chose 
one option from the six cereals and rated how similar the six 
options were (scale ranging from 1, not at all, to 9, very simi-
lar). Participants who had chosen among differently priced 
entrées were assigned to choose among identically priced 
cereals, and vice versa. Although identical prices would not 
normally draw attention, we reasoned that participants who 
saw varying prices in the first choice (entrées) would be 
primed to think about price and that their attention would be 
drawn to prices in the second choice (cereals), even if all 
options had the same price. Therefore, we expected that every-
one would attend to price in the second choice, either because 
the prices varied in the second choice or because the prices had 
varied in the first choice. In the first choice, however, only 
participants who were told that the options differed in price 
were expected to attend to price.
Results and discussion
Results for the first choice replicated our previous finding: 
Participants in the same-price condition perceived the five 
entrées as less similar (M = 2.40) than did participants in the 
different-price condition (M = 3.33), t(92) = −2.71, p < .01, 
η2 = .074. However, the reverse was true for the second choice: 
Similarity ratings were higher among participants told that 
the cereals had identical prices (M = 5.43) than among 
participants told that the cereals had different prices (M = 
4.09), t(92) = 3.19, p < .01, η2 = .100. These results support the 
notion that attributes that are identical across alternatives are 
likely to be ignored. However, when attention is drawn to 
these attributes, they can enter into similarity judgments and 
increase perceived similarity.
Study 3: Price Differences Affect Choice 
Difficulty Through Perceived Similarity
Our next study tested the consequences of this similarity effect 
for choice. Research has shown that similar options can be 
seen as more substitutable for one another and may therefore 
elicit less anticipated regret and less choice difficulty (Sagi & 
Friedland, 2007). In this study, we measured substitutability 
and choice difficulty to examine whether the similarity effect 
observed in Study 1 indeed makes choice options more substi-
tutable and choices less difficult.
Method
Forty-eight university students (38% women, 62% men) were 
recruited around campus for a short survey. Participants were 
assigned to one of two conditions and presented with six cereal 
options (Honey Bunches of Oats, Multigrain, Organic Promise 
Strawberry Fields, Organic Pumpkin Granola, Raisin Bran 
Crunch, and Cinnamon Pecan). In the same-price condition, 
prices for all the cereals were the same ($4.23); in the differ-
ent-price condition, the following six prices were randomly 
matched to the six cereals: $3.83, $3.89, $3.96, $4.07, $4.15, 
and $4.23. Participants chose one cereal. They then indicated 
how difficult and how easy it was to make the choice and how 
substitutable the options were, using 9-point scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very).
Results and discussion
We averaged the ratings of choice difficulty and ease (reverse-
scored) to obtain a single score for choice difficulty (r = .87). 
Participants in the same-price condition experienced more dif-
ficulty in choosing (M = 4.83) than did participants in the dif-
ferent-price condition (M = 3.64), t(46) = 2.12, p < .05, η2 = 
.089. They also perceived the options to be less substitutable 
(same-price condition: M = 5.39; different-price condition: 
M = 6.64), t(46) = 2.13, p < .05, η2 = .090. Further, changes in 
perceived substitutability mediated the effect of price differ-
ences on choice difficulty, 95% bootstrapped confidence inter-
val = [0.015, 1.096] (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).
Study 4: Consequences for Choice Deferral 
in Real Choices
In Studies 1 through 3, all participants were forced to make a 
choice. If an option to defer is available, however, the diffi-
culty experienced during the choice process can affect whether 
or not the choice is made. Prior research has shown that greater 
choice difficulty leads to greater likelihood of choice deferral 
(e.g., Dhar, 1996, 1997). Because slight differences in price 
reduced choice difficulty in Study 3, we anticipated that such 
differences will decrease the tendency to defer choice. Study 4 
examined an actual choice that included the option to defer. 
We predicted that making prices slightly different would 
reduce the frequency with which participants deferred a 
choice.
Method
Study 4 was conducted in a psychology laboratory in a Korean 
university. Seventy-eight students (51% women, 49% men) 
were given W=1,000 (approximately $1) that they could use to 
purchase one of two types of gum, which had either the same 
price (W=630; same-price condition) or slightly different prices 
(W=620 and W=640, or vice versa; different-price condition). 
Participants could also choose to buy neither gum, keeping all 
their money.
Results and discussion
The percentage of participants who chose to purchase one of 
the gums did not differ significantly between the two versions 
of the different-price condition (84% vs. 70%), χ2(1, N = 39) = 
1.54, n.s., so we collapsed them for the following analysis. 
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As predicted, participants were more likely to purchase one of 
the options when the prices differed (77% of participants) than 
when the prices were the same (46% of participants), χ2(1, N = 
78) = 7.80, p < .01, ϕ = .316.
General Discussion
Introducing a small difference in an otherwise identical attri-
bute can increase the perceived similarity of choice alterna-
tives. This finding stands in contrast to the idea (underlying 
many similarity models) that similarity always decreases with 
the introduction of differences. When differences are very 
small, the attention drawn to these differences (compared with 
an invariant attribute) can cause an increase in perceived simi-
larity. This increased similarity can reduce choice difficulty 
and the likelihood of choice deferral. In our final study, intro-
ducing a 3% difference in price nearly doubled the incidence 
of purchase.
In our studies, we manipulated one attribute: price. Future 
research could examine the effect of introducing differences in 
other attributes. Previous studies have suggested that quantita-
tive (alignable) distinctive features draw more attention than 
qualitative (nonalignable) distinctive features (e.g., Markman 
& Gentner, 1993). People tend to use quantitative attributes 
rather than qualitative attributes in comparisons because quali-
tative differences are difficult to process. Introducing small 
differences in qualitative attributes, such as color, might not 
draw attention to the same extent that introducing quantitative 
differences does, and might not produce the similarity effect 
we observed in the case of price. However, prior research has 
demonstrated that qualitative attributes may be processed sim-
ilarly to quantitative attributes when differences are small 
(Herrmann, Heitmann, Morgan, Henneberg, & Landwehr, 
2009). Future research could examine whether slight varia-
tions in qualitative attributes produce the similarity effects 
observed in the present studies, as well as whether slight varia-
tions in quantitative attributes other than price also produce 
these effects.
Our studies examined a similarity effect in the context of 
choice, when the explicit goal is to focus on differences (i.e., 
for the purpose of making a choice). Identical attributes gener-
ally are not an important basis for choosing. It would be inter-
esting to examine whether the observed similarity effect 
extends to nonchoice contexts, in which identical attributes 
might naturally attract more attention.
We found that adding differences increased perceived simi-
larity and willingness to choose, but there may be some 
instances in which adding differences increases choice defer-
ral. For example, we manipulated price differences in choice 
sets with six or fewer options and only a few attributes. If 
people are making a choice among a larger number of options, 
adding differences may make the choice too complex and may 
decrease willingness to choose (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).
Although we examined the consequences of slight differ-
ences for choice difficulty and choice deferral, some research 
suggests that our similarity effect could have additional 
consequences. For example, Wang, Novemsky, Dhar, and 
Baumeister (2010) found that choices involving large trade-
offs deplete executive resources more than choices involving 
smaller trade-offs, and result in greater self-regulation failure 
in subsequent unrelated tasks. Introducing a small difference 
in an otherwise identical attribute might reduce the perceived 
trade-offs and reduce depletion of executive resources, and 
increase subsequent self-regulation. For example, if people 
perceive a choice between identically priced options as involv-
ing larger trade-offs than a choice between options with 
slightly different prices, they may expend more executive 
resources on the choice in the former case and might be less 
able to choose a virtue over a vice after making such a choice. 
Our preliminary study supports this prediction.
Small differences across choice options may seem trivial. 
Indeed, we examined people’s intuitions about their choices in 
a follow-up study and found that most people predicted that 
small price differences would not affect their choices and 
underestimated their tendency to pay attention to those differ-
ences. The present research suggests the opposite—that small 
differences can have a substantial impact on decision making.
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